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INTRODUCTION 
 
Imitation is no longer the sincerest form of flattery. Just ask Jessica. Jessica, 17, was 
enjoying her final carefree days as a high school senior in Minnesota when she discovered that 
there was someone purporting to be her on social media – same name, same picture, same 
biography.1 That Jessica, however, was much darker. She was posting pornographic content, 
pushing Canadian real estate, and pitching Ghanaian cryptocurrency. The real Jessica immediately 
reported the account to Twitter, but it would take two years for the platform’s security algorithm 
to finally flag and suspend the account.2 The following year, the New York Attorney General took 
an unprecedented step and became the first state authority to hold the “troll factory”3 responsible 
for digital deception accountable for stealing and selling personal data from 55,000 people, 
including minors.4 Unfortunately, this cautionary tale came too late. 
 Two weeks after Jessica publicly shared her ordeal with The New York Times, the United 
States Department of Justice unsealed an indictment alleging Russian “specialists”5 at a factory 
called Internet Research Agency (“IRA”) had stolen the identities of 87 million Facebook users6 
with the help of a political data mining firm associated with the Trump campaign, Cambridge 
 
1Nicholas Confessore et al., The Follower Factory, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018),           
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/27/technology/social-media-bots.html. 
2 Id. 
3 The term refers to large, centralized units that focus on producing disinformation and participating on social media. 
See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Inside the Russian Troll Factory, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), 
www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/world/europe/russia-troll-factory.html (explaining the mechanics of the Russian 
government’s largest troll factory). 
4 Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Groundbreaking Settlement with Sellers of Fake Followers and “Likes” on Social 
Media (January 30, 2019), www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-general-james-announces-groundbreaking-
settlement-sellers-fake-followers. 
5 See United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al., No. 1: 18-cr-00032-DLF, 2018 WL 914777 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 
16, 2018). 
6 David Patrikarakos, In ‘Targeted,’ Data is the Precious Coin of the Realm of Digital Robber Barons, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 11, 2019), www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/in-targeted-data-is-the-precious-coin-of-the-realm-of-digital-
robber-barons/2019/10/11/f1cff630-eaa0-11e9-9306-47cb0324fd44_story.html. 
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Analytica.7 The operation had comprised a database consisting of five thousand data points on 
every Facebook user in the United States over the age of eighteen.8 The factory employed 
behavioral and clinical psychologists9 who sorted and fed the data to bots who then targeted users 
with divisive conspiratorial messages.10 Masquerading as Americans, “specialists” worked in 
twelve hour shifts and were required to make 80 comments and 20 shares on Twitter and 
Facebook11 in multiple languages.12 The mandatory quota was orchestrated to take advantage of 
the algorithms of the social network sites (“SNSs”),13 to ensure each divisive post would be 
classified as a “trend”14 and placed it on a prominent list capturing the attention of a large audience 
for a short period of time.15 The goal was to impair, obstruct and defeat “the lawful governmental  
functions  of  the  United  States,” including the 2016 U.S. presidential election.16 And impair they 
did. In the last three months of the U.S. presidential election, “fake news” generated almost 120% 
more shares, reactions, and comments on Facebook than actual current event coverage.17 
Social media has shifted from being a niche “social” activity to a democratized daily deluge 
 
7 Andy Greenberg, Mueller Indictment: Russian Trolls Stole Real US Identities to Fool Facebook, WIRED (Feb. 29, 
2018), www.wired.com/story/russian-trolls-identity-theft-mueller-indictment/. 
8 Patrikarakos, supra note 6. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 See MacFarquhar, supra note 3. 
12 See Ashley Nicolas, Taming the Trolls: The Need for an International Legal Framework to Regulate State Use of 
Disinformation on Social Media, 107 GEO L.J. ONLINE 36, 44 (2018). 
13 See Danah Boyd & Nicole Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUT. 
MEDIATED COMMUN. 210, 211 (2007) (defining SNSs as “web-based services that allow individuals to: [1] construct 
a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, [2] articulate a list of other users with whom they share a 
connection, and [3] view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system" and 
explaining that "[t]he nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site to site”). 
14 Jarred Prier, Commanding the Trend: Social Media as Information Warfare, 11 STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 52 (2017). 
15 Sitaram Asur et al., Trends in Social Media: Persistence and Decay, ARXIV (2011). 
16 See Internet Research Agency, supra note 5. 
17 Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News on 
Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 15, 2016), www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-
news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook. 
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of news and activity.18 Far from America’s initial conception of a “marketplace of ideas,”19 SNSs 
today are stacked with “fake news,” disinformation20 and misinformation.21 Now, a relatively 
small number of individuals can disseminate massive amounts of “fake news,”22 manipulate real 
news23 in real-time,24 and even develop doctored audio and visual news,25 all with a standard 
camera and laptop. Initially conceived as a communication medium for a select portion of the 
population,26 SNSs currently count 3.5 billion users,27 with 288 million new users joining in the 
past year alone.28 As of January 1, 2019, 45% of the world’s population are on SNSs, with North 
America reporting the largest overall usage rate of 88.1% of the total population.29 Within these 
swelling numbers are also the growing population of fake accounts, “bots,” originating from “troll 
 
18 Andrew McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of 
Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 889-91 (2006) (describing the Internet as a means to “a worldwide gossip 
mall” and positing that “[p]rivate individuals did not possess or have access to instruments for widely disseminating 
information”). 
19 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (explaining that “when men have realized 
that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe . . . the ultimate good desired is better reached by 
free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market”). 
20 Michael Landon-Murray et al., Disinformation in Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy: Impacts and Ethics in an Era 
of Fake News, Social Media, and Artificial Intelligence, 21 PUB. INTEGRITY 512, 513 (defining disinformation as 
“intentionally false information to serve an objective”). 
21 Landon-Murray et al., supra note 20 (defining as “simply incorrect information”).  
22 MATTHEW BAUM ET AL., COMBATING FAKE NEWS (2017). 
23 Alina Selyukh, Hackers Send Fake Market-Moving AP Tweet on White House Explosions, REUTERS (Apr. 31, 
2013), www.reuters.com/article/net-us-usa-whitehouse-ap/hackers-send-fake-market-moving-ap-tweet-on-white-
house-explosions-idUSBRE93M12Y20130423 (reporting the official @AP Twitter account was hacked and tweeted 
that two explosions at the White House injured President Obama, causing U.S. markets to plunge). 
24 @BuzzFeed, You Won’t Believe What Obama Says in this Video!, TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2018), 
www.twitter.com/buzzfeed/status/986257991799222272?. 
25 Supasorn Suwajanakorn et al., Synthesizing Obama: Learning Lip Sync from Audio, 36 ACM TRANS. GRAPH. (2017) 
(highlighting how students used A.I. to create visually convincing videos of President Obama saying things he had 
said before in a completely different context by feeding a neural network seventeen hours of footage from former 
addresses as ‘training data’). 
26 Simon Kemp, Digital 2019: Global Internet Use Accelerates, WE ARE SOCIAL (Jan. 30, 2019), 
www.wearesocial.com/blog/2019/01/digital-2019-global-internet-use-accelerates. 
27 David Meltzer, Combating the Millennial Attention Span to Keep Your Team Engaged, ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 4, 
2017), www.entrepreneur.com/article/297833. 
28 Id. 
29 Kemp, supra note 26. 
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factories.” About 15% of Twitters active accounts, totaling 48 million, have been reported as fake30 
and Facebook has reported roughly 60 million fake accounts.31  
From “fakes news” to filter bubbles, the Internet seems to be broken and the growing 
consensus32 is that SNSs are to blame.33 As the digital disease spreads, the deception devolves,34 
exacerbating extremist points of view courtesy of massive personal data breaches35 used by 
increasingly realistic bots creating the appearance of public support.36 The finely-tuned algorithms 
amplify extreme and outrageous speech37 by manipulating common cognitive biases38 and 
addicting us to the chaos.39 With the arrival of “deep fakes,” which allow audio and visual 
 
30 Onur Varol et al., Online Human-Bot Interactions: Detection, Estimation, and Characterization, ARXIV (2017). 
31 Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online: Working with Tech to Find Solutions, Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism, 115th Cong. 134 (2017) (statement of Colin Stretch, Vice 
President and General Counsel, Facebook. 
32 2019 Trust Barometer, EDELMAN (Jan. 30, 2019) (finding 73% of people worry about fake news being used as a 
weapon and only 43% trust social media as a reliable source of information). 
33 See, e.g., FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH (2017); JONATHAN 
TAPLIN, MOVE FAST AND BREAK THINGS: HOW FACEBOOK, GOOGLE, AND AMAZON CORNERED CULTURE AND 
UNDERMINED DEMOCRACY (2017); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING: (AND WHY WE 
SHOULD WORRY) (2011). 
34 In 2016, one IRA “specialist” made an average of 2,442 Facebook posts a month. In 2019, IRA Facebook posts 
have tripled, averaging 8,900 posts in October alone, yielding more than 9.7 million interactions by over 1.7 million 
accounts. There is also evidence the IRA and other factories are now leveraging local individuals as proxies to create 
and post content and even paying to rent their social media accounts to do the same. See e.g., Shelby Grossman et 
al., Stanford University Internet Observatory, Evidence of Russia-Linked Influence Operations in Africa (Oct. 29, 
2019); Davey Alba & Sheera Frenkel, Russia Tests New Disinformation Tactics in Africa to Expand Influence, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2019), www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/technology/russia-facebook-disinformation-africa.html. 
35 Confessore et al., supra note 1. 
36 Robinson Meyer, The Grim Conclusions of the Largest-Ever Study of Fake News, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2018), 
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/largest-study-ever-fake-news-mit-twitter/555104/. 
37 Molly J. Crockett, Moral Outrage in the Digital Age, 1 NAT. HUM. BEHAV. 769, 771 (2017) (“[O]utrage-inducing 
content appears to be more prevalent and potent online than offline”). 
38 Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and False News Online, 359 SCI. 1146, 1150 (2018) (Finding in a 
SNSs study that "Falsehood diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all 
categories of information, and the effects were more pronounced for false political news . . . human behavior 
contributes more to the differ- ential spread of falsity and truth than automated robots do."). 
39 Kasey Panetta, Top Strategic Predictions for 2018 and Beyond, GARTNER (Oct. 3, 2017), 
www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/gartner-top-strategic-predictions-for-2018-and-beyond ("[By 2022] the 
majority of individuals in mature economies will consume more false information than true information.”). 
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manipulation of real people,40 the Internet is about to become much more insane. As one scholar 
says, “[T]hink of it as a destructive variation of the Turing test: imitation designed to mislead and 
deceive rather than to emulate and iterate.”41 
The ‘Internet Age’ of today is arguably the most profound transformation of information 
since the invention of the printing press. Whereas oil fueled the factories of the Industrial Age, 
personal data42 is driving a veritable artificial intelligence (“A.I.”) arms race43 and the United 
States, with its inadequate privacy protections,44 is the Wild West. SNSs have amassed massive 
reserves of users’ personal data, some of which they pawn off on a veritable black market to 
“behind the scenes actors”45 and some of which third parties simply steal.46 It has become clear 
 
40 Samantha Cole, There is No Tech Solution to Deepfakes, VICE (Aug. 26, 2018), 
www.vice.com/en_us/article/594qx5/there-is-no-tech-solution-to-deepfakes. 
41 Danielle Citron & Robert Chesney, Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 30, 2019). 
42 Jack Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech 
Regulation, 51 U.C.D. L. Rᴇᴠ 1149, 1154 (2017). 
43 American companies alone are estimated to have spent over $19 billion in 2018 acquiring and analyzing consumer 
data. See Louise Matsakis, The Guide to Your Personal Data (and Who Is Using It), WIRED (Feb. 13, 2019), 
www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-personal-data-collection/. For example. Google has made more than a dozen AI 
and robotics acquisitions, spending $500 million alone on the purchase of DeepMind, a British AI development 
company that defines its mission as “solv[ing] intelligence” by combining “the best techniques from machine 
learning and systems neuroscience to build powerful general-purpose learning algorithms,” see, e.g., Dan Rowinski, 
Google’s Game Of Moneyball In The Age Of Artificial Intelligence, READWRITE (Jan. 29, 2014), 
www.readwrite.com/2014/01/29/google-artificial-intelligence-robots-cognitive-computing-moneyball/; Ingrid 
Lunden, Google’s DeepMind Acqui-Hires Two AI Teams In The UK, Partners With Oxford, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 24, 
2014), www.social.techcrunch.com/2014/10/23/googles-deepmind-acqui-hires-two-ai-teams-in-the-uk-partners-
with-oxford/; Adam Clark Estes, Meet Google’s Robot Army. It’s Growing., GIZMODO (Jan. 22, 2014), 
www.gizmodo.com/a-humans-guide-to-googles-many-robots-1509799897. 
44 See infra Parts III.B.1-3. 
45 Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FED. TRADE COMM’N, Opening Remarks at PrivacyCon 2017 (Jan. 12, 2017), 
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/videos/privacycon-2017-part-1/ftc_privacycon_2017__transcript_segment_1 
.pdf  (discussing the increasing number of “behind the scenes” companies gathering personal data); FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2014), 
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-
commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf (discussing how data brokers obtain consumer information). 
46 See, e.g., Lily Newman, Twitter Puts Profit Ahead of User Privacy—Just Like Facebook Did Before, WIRED (Oct. 
2, 2019), www.wired.com/story/twitter-two-factor-advertising/ (reporting 32.8 million Twitter credentials may have 
been leaked); BBC NEWS (Apr. 4, 2019), www.bbc.com/news/technology-47812470 (reporting on authorities finding 
a “massive cache of data on unsecured Amazon servers used by a Mexican social media firm”); Paul Grewal, Deputy 
Vice President and General Counsel, Suspending Cambridge Analytica and SCL Group from Facebook, FACEBOOK 
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that personal data is really the price that must be paid for use of the ‘free’ platforms.47 Through 
manipulation of primal behaviors,48 SNSs promote personal freedom of expression while 
simultaneously constraining and commodifying their users,49  thereby making personal privacy 
become a paradox.50 In a democracy with easily accessible anonymity,51 bad actors face no real-
life consequences for their digital deceptions52 and there is no A.I. algorithmic accountability.53 
Conversely, individuals’ SNSs data is somehow seeping from the digital realm to the real world. 
Colleges are collecting data about prospective students,54 stores are employing statisticians to sift 
through data to predict purchases,55 health insurance companies are relying on data to determine 
 
(Mar. 16, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/03/suspending-cambridge-analytica/ (reporting Cambridge 
Analytica exposed private user information by violating Facebook’s privacy platform); In addition to violations of 
privacy protocols, Facebook and Twitter have recently reported  hackers have intentionally infiltrated their 'private' 
networks. See Guy Rosen, Vice President of Product Management, Security Update, FACEBOOK (Sept. 28, 2018), 
www.newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/09/security-update/(reporting that hackers exploited a vulnerability in 
Facebook’s code affecting nearly 50 million accounts); Kate Conger et al., Former Twitter Employees Charged with 
Spying for Saudi Arabia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2019), www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/technology/twitter-saudi-
arabia-spies.html (reporting on how Saudi Arabian spies rose through the ranks of Twitter accessing “personal 
information and account data of Twitter customers that included users’ telephone numbers and I.P. addresses”). 
47 Mary Madden & George Gao, Privacy and Cybersecurity: Key Findings, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 16, 2015), 
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/01/16/privacy/ (reporting 91% of Americans say they have lost control over 
how personal information is collected with only 2% viewing them as “very secure”). 
48  See infra Part II. 
49 See, DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 6 
(2007) ("[A]s people use the freedom-enhancing dimensions of the Internet, as they express themselves and engage 
in self-development, they may be constraining the freedom and self-development of others – and even of 
themselves.”). 
50 Lee Rainie, Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era of Privacy Concerns, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Mar. 27, 2018), www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-social-
media-in-an-era-of-privacy-concerns (“When it comes to algorithms that underpin the social media environment, 
users’ comfort level with sharing personal information depends heavily on how and why their data are being used.”). 
51 Kasey Panetta, Top Strategic Predictions for 2018 and Beyond, GARTNER (Oct. 3, 2017), 
www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/gartner-top-strategic-predictions-for-2018-and-beyond (predicting by 2022, 
the majority of individuals in mature economies will consume more false information than true information). 
52 Eric Jardine, The Dark Web Dilemma: Tor, Anonymity and Online Policing, Global Comm’n on Internet 
Governance Paper Series, No. 21 (September 30, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2667711. 
53 See infra Parts III.B.1-3. 
54 Douglas MacMillan & Nick Anderson, Student Tracking, Secret Scores, WASH. POSt (Oct. 2, 2019), 
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/10/14/colleges-quietly-rank-prospective-students-based-their-personal-
data (finding forty-four universities collecting data by tracking Web activity and then assigning predictive scores of 
likelihood of enrolling). 
55 Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at MM30 (discovering Target employed 
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the appropriate level of care,56 and prisons are deferring to algorithmic assessments regarding 
prisoners’ bail.57 All of which, currently, is perfectly legal in the United States.58  
This paper seeks to develop a viable framework in response to these digital developments 
that secures personal social media data by first recalibrating the concept of personal privacy and 
then reconceptualizing it as property. Part II explains the science reinforcing the symbiotic, 
cyclical relationship between individuals and SNS platforms, the core of which is the reward 
center. As naturally social animals, humans have certain primal needs and SNSs afford unlimited 
access to their fulfillment while simultaneously increasing their own profits. The net result of this 
relationship has affectively commodified users,59 without SNSs providing any 
compensation.60Advances in A.I., from trained algorithms to the more advanced self-learning 
neural networks, have afforded SNSs unprecedent access to audiences in depth and breadth, 
allowing for innovative and insidious means of user manipulation.  
Part III address the paradox of privacy in regard to devising, implementing, and enforcing 
it as a legal right, particularly in a nation with competing equities. From its inception, the 
 
statisticians to sift through buying records of women who had signed up for baby registries and then assigning them 
a pregnancy prediction score). 
56 Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, VERGE (Mar. 21, 2018), 
www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy (reporting health 
insurance companies using Internet data tracking tools, called “instruments,” used in informing decisions about care). 
57 See generally Fred Cate & Jane Winn, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROT. IN 
AGE OF “INFO. ECON.” 37 (2006) (reporting an increasing number of jurisdictions are transitioning away from a 
monetary system to one dependent on risk-assessment algorithms). 
58 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee's note to 1970 amendment. (“The inclusive description of 
'documents' is revised to accord with changing technology. It makes clear that Rule 34 applies to electronic data 
compilations. . . ."). See generally Gordon Gottsegen & Josie Colt, How to Delete Your Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, 
and Snapchat, WIRED (Mar. 20, 2018), www.wired.com/story/how-to-delete-your-facebook-instagram-twitter-
snapchat. 
59 See generally Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. (1980) (explaining modern day privacy 
infringements manifest in the commodification of individuals). 
60 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, VERSION 2.0 (2006) (advocating the 
use of property rights to protect privacy on the Internet). 
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amorphous concept of ‘privacy’ has been a reactionary afterthought in the American legal 
system.61 The inherent tension in developing effective privacy laws in the United States for a fast-
moving digital frontier is a foundational tension. The delineation between promoting collective 
progress62 versus protecting individual determinism63 is a precarious proposition. However, as 
SNSs continue to cross personal boundaries, using and misusing neuroscience to recklessly 
manipulate and profit off of their users,64 the need to recalibrate antiquated regulatory processes 
with shifting social norms is crucial.65 Part III provides a snapshot of where three government 
⎯the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), Congress, and the Supreme Court. currently stand on 
the issue of personal data privacy protections, providing insight into the current shortcomings of 
preexisting protections today.  
Taking into account the science of SNSs, the contextual complexity of privacy protections, 
and the current, respective structural institutional constraints, Part IV proposes reconceptualizing 
personal social media data as private property. Reclassifying this digital data as personal property 
accurately reflects the psychology discussed in Part II and overcomes the challenges of Part III as 
it allows for definitive institutional and ideological parameters to be developed and applied. From 
this framework, recasting SNSs as information fiduciaries more accurately encapsulates the role 
of similarly situated others. Further, under this re-conception, the structurally solid, but rigid, legal 
institutions would have to make minimal changes within the preconceived property frameworks 
 
61 See infra Parts III.B.1-3. 
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”). 
63 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”) 
64 See infra Parts II.A.-B.  
65 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy, and Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. 
& TECH. (2014). 
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and arguably would be more effective in their ex post roles. 
I. THE SYMBIOTIC SCIENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
A.I. advancements have enhanced SNSs’ effectiveness in engaging users, but the driving 
force to their success is the neurological need to intimate and socialize.66 SNSs’ continued success 
and profitability depend on scalability, which is driven by A.I. algorithms fueled by personal user 
data.67 The more photos, videos, text, and audio users upload to SNSs, the more A.I. algorithms 
learn to “see”68 what interests the individual user and the “smarter” these algorithms become. In 
turn, as timelines and newsfeeds become increasingly personalized69 and user engagement is 
exponentially enhanced,70 the A.I. algorithms reach a tipping point at which they no longer have 
to wait for the individual to feed them data, they can infer predicative individual behaviors on their 
 
66 See Sandra Blakeslee, Cells that Read Minds, N.Y. TIMES,  Jan. 10, 2006, F00001 (“The human brain has multiple 
mirror neuron systems that specialize in carrying out and understanding not just the actions of others but their 
intentions, the social meaning of their behavior and their emotions.”); See also, Kelly Dickerson et al., The Role of 
the Human Mirror Neuron System in Supporting Communication in a Digital World, 8 FRONT. PSYCHOL. 698 (2017). 
67 See Bruce Schneier, A Taxonomy of Social Networking Data, 8 IEEE SEC. & PRIV'Y 88 (Jul. 26, 2010), 
www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/11/a_taxonomy_of_s.html (defining "data" as: personal information given to 
SNSs that is required for individuals  to register, information personally posted by users on SNSs' platforms, and 
personal information that is hidden from plain sight, but is collected by SNSs regarding individuals' activity on their 
platform). 
68 Will Oremus, Who Controls Your Facebook Feed, SLATE (Jan. 2, 2016) (explaining the Facebook algorithm assigns 
a “relevancy” score to every post it could possibly show a particular user at a particular point in time). 
69 Oremus, supra note 65 (“Once every possible post in your feed has received its relevancy score, the sorting 
algorithm can put them in the order that you’ll see them on the screen. The post you see at the top, then, has been 
chosen over thousands of others as the one most likely to make you laugh, cry, smile, click, like, share, or comment.”). 
70 Id. (“[C]licks, likes, shares, and comments are what make posts go viral, turn individual users into communities, 
and drive traffic to the advertisers that Facebook relies on for revenue.”). 
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own.71  Thus, the capabilities of SNSs today are truly difficult to understate.72 Section A discusses 
the science propelling people to use SNSs and explain why engagement continues to increase in 
spite of privacy violations and deception. Section B reviews how SNSs have created code that 
mirrors and manipulates the human needs discussed in Section A and, thereby, have increased 
engagement and revenues.  
A.  The Individual 
The role individuals play in the digital ecosystem, as both producers and consumers of 
personal information, is crucial to the success of SNSs.73 Afterall, humans are posting the content 
and creating the data, not the SNSs.74 Thus, it is important to understand what compels individuals 
to post. 
Humans are naturally social beings with a fundamental need to belong and an inherent 
desire for social status.75 Over time, the human brain has evolved neural wiring that rewards 
 
71 A.I. analyzes diverse, rich user data and assigns it unpredictable values in order to infer user preferences, sensitive 
attributes (e.g., race, gender, sexual orientation), and opinions (e.g., political stances), or to predict behaviors (e.g., 
to serve advertisements). See Brent Mittelstadt et al., The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate, 3 BIG DATA & 
SOC'Y 1–2 (2016). See, e.g., Google Search Changes Tackle Fake News and Hate Speech, BBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 
2017), www.bbc.com/news/technology-39707642 (“Facebook announced it had begun to assign each of its users a 
reputation score, predicting their trustworthiness on a scale from zero to one. The methodology behind its scoring is 
unclear. Google has added new metrics to its ranking systems that should help to stop false information from entering 
the top results for particular search terms. Twitter is also assessing a user’s reputation for credibility by the behavior 
of others in a person’s network as a risk factor in judging whether a person’s tweets should be spread.”). 
72 Samanth Subramanian, Inside the Macedonian Fake-News Complex, WIRED (Feb. 5, 2017), 
www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fake-news. 
73 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 65. 
74 Jonathan Zittrain, Privacy 2.0, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 100 (“We live in an age in which many of us privately 
maintain records or record fragments on one another. Through peer-produced social networking services like 
Facebook or MySpace, we share these records with thousands of others, or allow them to be indexed to create 
powerful mosaics of personal data.”). 
75 See generally, Roy Baumeister & Mark Leary, The Need to Belong - Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a 
Fundamental Human-Motivation., 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497 (May 1995) 497, 499-508.  
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behaviors that seek out stimuli of social value76 and encourage social interactions.77 Collectively, 
social rewards activate three areas of the brain: the ventral tegmental (“VTA”), the prefrontal 
cortex, and the ventral striatum.78 Collectively referred to as the mesolimbic pathway, 79 the VTA 
projects neurotransmitters of dopamine to the nucleus accumbens (“NAcc”), located in the ventral 
striatum, each time a response to a stimulus results in a reward. 80 Over time, through a process 
called long-term potentiation, repeated reward responses create stronger associations and increase 
the intensity of responses.81 The context and cadence in which dopamine is released and received 
has important implications because the brain automatically associates the preceding behavior with 
this reward.82 Eventually, the simple anticipation of a reward in connection with that behavior will 
release dopamine83 and doing so intermittently can turn the dopamine-triggering behavior into a 
habit.84 
The human brain is malleable and not as steadfastly hard-wired as scientists once thought.85  
 
76 Cameron Anderson et al., Is the Desire for Status a Fundamental Human Motive? A Review of the Empirical 
Literature., 141 PSYCH. BULL. 574, 579 (2015). 
77 Rebecca Von Der Heide et al., The Social Network-Network: Size is Predicted by Brain Structure and Function in 
the Amygdala and Paralimbic Regions, 9 SOC. COGN. AFFECT. NEUROSCI. 1962, 1963 (2014). 
78 See, e.g., Sylvia Morelli et al., The Neural Bases of Feeling Understood and Not Understood, 9 SOC. COGN. AFFECT. 
NEUROSCI. 1890 (2014); Vasily Klucharev et al., Reinforcement Learning Signal Predicts Social Conformity, 61 
NEURON. 140 (2009); Mitja Back et al., Facebook Profiles Reflect Actual Personality, Not Self-Idealization, 21 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 372, 372–74 (2010) (finding participants were expressing and communicating real personality rather 
than promoting idealized versions of themselves). 
79 Sören Krach et al., The Rewarding Nature of Social Interactions, 4 FRONT BEHAV. NEUROSCI. 1 (May 28, 2010). 
80 Diana I. Tamir & Jason P. Mitchell, Disclosing Information About the Self is Intrinsically Rewarding, 109 PROC. 
NATL. ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 8038 (2012) (explaining participants underwent fMRI scanning and a significantly greater 
response was observed in the NAcc bilaterally when disclosing one’s own opinions and attitudes than when judging 
those of another and both the NAcc bilaterally and the VTA responded more strongly when disclosing beliefs about 
one’s own personality traits than when judging others). 
81 Joe L. Martinez & Brian E. Derrick, Long-Term Potentiation and Learning, 47 ANNU. REV. PSYCHOL. 173 (1996). 
82 Matthias Gruber et al., States of Curiosity Modulate Hippocampus-Dependent Learning via the Dopaminergic 
Circuit, 84 NEURON. 486 (2014). 
83 Wolfram Schultz, Dopamine Reward Prediction Error Coding, 18 DIALOGUES CLIN. NEUROSCI. 23 (2016). 
84 Kelly McSweeney, This is Your Brain on Instagram: Effects of Social Media on the Brain, NOW (Mar. 17, 2019), 
https://now.northropgrumman.com/this-is-your-brain-on-instagram-effects-of-social-media-on-the-brain/. 
85 Julie Hamaide et al., Neuroplasticity and MRI: A Perfect Match, 131 NEUROIMAGE 13 (2016); See generally 
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Accordingly, the increasing individual use of and time spent on SNSs, with their unprecedent 
unlimited supply of social stimuli and rewards, 86 has caused individual and public identities to 
converge.87 Although individuals, in general, feel freer to self-audit their presentation and 
interactions88 on SNSs, such control empowers89 the individual’s converged conception of 
themselves. Thus, a SNSs profile is more than just a virtual representation. 90 
Individuals intuit the type of content that will conform best to the attitudes of their social 
 
Christian Montag & Sarah Diefenbach, Towards Homo Digitalis: Important Research Issues for Psychology and the 
Neurosciences at the Dawn of the Internet of Things and the Digital Society, 10 SUSTAINABILITY 415 (2018).  
86 See, e.g., Christian Ruff & Ernst Fehr, The Neurobiology of Rewards and Values in Social Decision Making, 15 
NATURE REV. 549 (2014); Sylvia Morelli et al., The Neural Bases of Feeling Understood and Not Understood, 9 
SOC. COGN. AFFECT. NEUROSCI. 1890 (2014); Vasily Klucharev et al., Reinforcement Learning Signal Predicts 
Social Conformity, 61 NEURON. 140 (2009); Daniel K. Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., How the Opinion of Others 
Affects Our Valuation of Objects, 20 CURR. BIOL. 1165 (2010); Christopher Davey et al., Being Liked Activates 
Primary Reward and Midline Self-Related Brain Regions, 31 HUM. BRAIN MAPP. 660 (2010); Keise Izuma et al., 
Processing of Social and Monetary Rewards in the Human Striatum, 58 NEURON. 284 (2008); Christoph Korn et al., 
Performance Feedback Processing Is Positively Biased as Predicted by Attribution Theory, 11 PLOS ONE (2016). 
87 Karolina Sylwester & Matthew Purver, Twitter Language Use Reflects Psychological Differences between 
Democrats and Republicans, 10 PLOS ONE (2015) (discovering that the psychological disparities among people 
with differing political orientations through individual word use on Twitter was resonant with previous research; 
liberals tend to place more emphasis on uniqueness and use more swear words, anxiety- and feeling-related words 
while conservatives value group association and their tweets contain more achievement and religion-related words); 
Danah Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in Teenage Social Life, 
MACARTHUR FOUNDATION SERIES ON DIGITAL LEARNING –YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA VOLUME 15 119, 
129 (2008) (“Because of the intricate connection between offline and online social worlds, the audience that teens 
envision online is connected to their social world offline, or to their hopes about the possible alternatives online.”); 
Dar Meshi et al., The Emerging Neuroscience of Social Media, 19 TRENDS IN COGN. SCI. 771 (2015) (“While the 
neural systems supporting these social cognitive processes have been studied extensively in the offline world, the 
online social media is comparatively new. However, experts continue to conclude that the digital world often mimics 
the offline social world and interactions within this online social network parallel offline social interactions.”). See 
generally CHRISTINE HINE, VIRTUAL ETHNOGRAPHY (2000); Malene Charlottte Larsen, Perspectives on Online 
Social Networking, 35 SOC. COMP. MAG. (2007).  
88 See, e.g., Liad Bareket-Bojmel et al., Strategic Self-Presentation on Facebook: Personal Motives and Audience 
Response to Online Behavior, 55 COMPUT. IN HUM. BEHAV. 788 (2016); Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, Privacy, Emotional 
Closeness, and Openness in Cyberspace, 19 COMPUT. IN HUM. BEHAV. 451 (2003). 
89 Katelyn McKenna & John Bargh, Plan 9 From Cyberspace: The Implications of the Internet for Personality and 
Social Psychology, 4 PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 57 (2000). 
90 See Russell Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self, 15 J. CONSUM. RES. 139, 139 (1988); Russell Belk, Digital 
Consumption and the Extended Self, 30 J. OF MKTG. MGMT. 1101 (2014).  
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circle,91 which reinforces pre-conceived notions.92 Features of SNSs, such as automatically 
personalized information feeds, encourage engagement, but also facilitate an individual’s descent 
into a digital ideological echo chamber,93 otherwise known as a “filter bubble.” 94 By catering to 
common cognitive biases95 and creatively manipulating the code of SNSs news feeds, bots and 
other bad actors are impressively successful at normalizing their inflammatory ideas.96 In a world 
that increasingly relies on SNSs as a primary source of information,97 the absence of traditional 
media gatekeepers98 allows for unfettered digital deceptions.99  
B. The Platform 
SNSs are ultimately businesses that succeed only through expanding audiences and their 
 
91 Hossein Derakhshan, The Web We Have to Save, MEDIUM (Jul. 14, 2015), https://medium.com/matter/the-web-we-
have-to-save-2eb1fe15a426 (referring to this as the “tyranny of the novel and the popular”). 
92 M. Mitchell Waldrop, News Feature: The Genuine Problem of Fake News, 114 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 
12631 (2017) (“People prefer to consume news or entertainment that reinforces what they already believe. And that, 
in turn, is rooted in well-understood psychological phenomena such as confirmation bias—our tendency to see only 
the evidence that confirms our existing opinions and to ignore or forget anything that doesn’t fit.”). 
93 Waldrop, supra note 120 (“[A] Facebook or Twitter newsfeed is just confirmation bias backed with computer power: 
What you see when you look at the top of the feed is determined algorithmically by what you and your friends like . 
. . discordant information gets pushed further and further down the queue, creating an insidious echo chamber."). 
94 ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: HOW THE NEW PERSONALIZED WEB IS CHANGING WHAT WE READ AND HOW 
WE THINK (2011). 
95 See Baum et al., supra note 22; see also Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and False News Online, 359 
SCI. 1146, 1149 (2018) (finding “[f]alsehood diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the 
truth in all categories of information, and the effects were more pronounced for false political news than for false 
news about terrorism, natural disasters, science, urban legends, or financial information”). 
96 See, e.g., Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions, 32 
POL. BEHAV. 303 (2010); Donal Flynn et al., The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: Understanding False and 
Unsupported Beliefs About Politics, ADVANCES IN POL. PSYCH. (2017); Jacob Ratkiewicz et al., Ass'n for the 
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, Detecting and Tracking Political Abuse in Social Media, FIFTH INT'L AAAI 
CONF. ON WEBLOGS AND SOC. MEDIA (2011) (“Bots are designed to amplify the reach of fake news and exploit the 
vulnerabilities that stem from our cognitive and social biases. For example, they create the appearance of popular 
grassroots campaigns to manipulate attention and target influential users to induce them to reshare misinformation.”). 
97 Mark Cohen, Law In The Age Of Social Media, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2016), 
www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2016/11/27/law-in-the-age-of-social-media/#42023fd31db8;  see also Hunt 
Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211 (2017) 
(reporting referral data shows “fake news” stories relied heavily on social media for traffic during the election). 
98 Citron & Chesney, supra note 41. 
99 DAVID PATRIKARAKOS, WAR IN 140 CHARACTERS: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA IS RESHAPING CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY- 
FIRST CENTURY (2017). 
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attention;100 they are not in the social media business, they are in the data trade industry.101 Thus, 
their success in selling these enviable enormous concentrated hives of attention to advertisers102 is 
determined by their ability to satisfy individuals’ primal social needs103 through social cognition, 
self-referential cognition, and social reward processing.104 A.I. algorithms, simply understood as 
self-learning codes fueled by user data, ensure and enforce these feedback loops. 
Effectively grabbing the attention of users for advertisers, SNSs are required to 
increasingly demanding detailed data and enhance engagement.105 Thus, it is unsurprising that the 
more active an individual is on a SNS, the more they feel connected,106 fulfilled,107 and gratified,108 
 
100 Tufekci, supra note 121 (“Facebook makes money, in other words, by profiling us and then selling our attention to 
advertisers, political actors and others. These are Facebook’s true customers, whom it works hard to please.”) 
101 DIG., CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMM., FINAL REPORT, 2017-19, HC 1630 (describing how Facebook traded 
access to user data in exchange for advertising buys); Gabriel Dance et al., Facebook Offered Users Privacy Wall, 
Then Let Tech Giants Around It, N. Y. TIMES, 1 (Dec. 19, 2018) (describing how personal data was traded among 
150 companies without user consent). 
102 Jack Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information 
Society, N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004). (“The digital revolution made a different kind of scarcity salient. It is not the 
scarcity of bandwidth but the scarcity of audiences, and, in particular, scarcity of audience attention.”) 
103 Natalya Bazarova & Yoon Hyung Choi, Self-Disclosure in Social Media: Extending the Functional Approach to 
Disclosure Motivations and Characteristics on Social Network Sites, 64 J. COMMUN. 635 (2014). 
104 Diana Tamir & Adrian Ward, Old Desires, New Media, in PSYCH. OF DESIRE 432; see also Matthew Pittman & 
Brandon Reich, Social Media and Loneliness: Why an Instagram Picture May Be Worth More than a Thousand 
Twitter Words, 62 COMP. IN HUM. BEHAV. 155 (2016) (“[T]he three primary psychological factors driving the 
continued use of Twitter, Facebook and Snapchat are: [1] comparison with other people, [2] feelings of trust and 
bonding, and [3] finding groups with attitudes and interests aligned with one’s own.”). 
105 Tufekci, supra note 121. 
106 Nicole Ellison et al., The Benefits of Facebook “Friends:” Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online 
Social Network Sites, 12 J. COMP.-MEDIATED COMM. 1143 (2007); Charles Steinfield et al., Social Capital, Self-
Esteem, and Use of Online Social Network Sites: A Longitudinal Analysis, 29 J. APP. DEV. PSYCH. 434 (2008); 
Sebastián Valenzuela et al., Is There Social Capital in a Social Network Site?: Facebook Use and College Students’ 
Life Satisfaction, Trust, and Participation1, 14 J. COMP.-MEDIATED COMM. 875 (2009); Gina Masullo Chen, Tweet 
this: A Uses and Gratifications Perspective on How Active Twitter Use Gratifies a Need to Connect with Others, 27 
COMP. IN HUM. BEHAV, 755 (2011). 
107 Aqdas Malik & Marko Nieminen, Uses and Gratifications of Digital Photo Sharing on Facebook, 33 TELEMATICS 
AND INFORMATICS (2015) (finding that when SNSs users sbared personal photos on SNSs, they felt 'fulfilled' from 
the attention and affection). 
108 Chei Sian Lee & Long Ma, News Sharing in Social Media: The Effect of Gratifications and Prior Experience, 28 
COMP. IN HUM. BEHAV. 331 (2012). 
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and the more likely they are to repeatedly engage with the platform.109 For example, upon 
registering for a Facebook account, the notification center includes activities from an initial set of 
connections, which establishes the link to social reward.110 The more a user uses the SNS, the more 
active the notification center becomes, establishing the expectation that anytime the user opens the 
application, they can reasonably expect to be rewarded.111 Another example is the notification 
algorithm from the Facebook-owned company, Instagram. The algorithm is programmed to 
withhold “likes” on photos and to deliver them in larger clusters at once. This intentional cadence 
is meant to take advantage of psychological anticipatory rewarding while simultaneously 
encouraging habitual use through balancing negative and positive feedback signals.112 
In the early days of SNSs, platforms were populated by content only from users’ immediate 
friends and family as the algorithms were based on engagements statistics alone113 and required 
structured data, meaning human manpower was required to interpret the data.114 The more data 
that is collected, the smarter, faster and more accurate the algorithms become.115 SNSs were quick 
 
109 Mike Allen, Sean Parker Unloads on Facebook, AXIOS (Nov. 9, 2017), www.axios.com/sean-parker-unloads-
on-facebook-god-only-knows-what-its-doing-to-our-childrens-brains-1513306792-f855e7b4-4e99-4d60-8d51-
2775559c2671.html (According to the founder of Facebook last year: “The thought process that went into 
building these applications, Facebook being the first of them, was all about: 'How do we consume as much of 
your time and conscious attention as possible?' … And that means that we need to sort of give you a little 
dopamine hit every once in a while, because someone liked or commented on a photo or a post or whatever. And 
that's going to get you to contribute more content, and that's going to get you… more likes and comments…. It's 
a social-validation feedback loop… exactly the kind of thing that a hacker like myself would come up with, 
because you're exploiting a vulnerability in human psychology.”) 
110 Tracii Ryan et al., The Uses and Abuses of Facebook, 3 J. BEHAV. ADDICT. 133 (2014). 
111 Id. 
112 60 Minutes: What is “Brain Hacking”?, CBS NEWS (Apr. 9, 2017), 
www.cbs.com/shows/60_minutes/video/tH3KnkheO5s1zWLe3kApXT_iDti_xiVC/brain-hacking/. 
113 WAEL GHONIM & JAKE RASHBASS, TRANSPARENCY: WHAT’S GONE WRONG WITH SOCIAL MEDIA AND WHAT CAN 
WE DO ABOUT IT?, SHORENSTEIN CTR. ON MEDIA, POLITICS, & PUB. POL'Y  (Mar. 3, 2018), 
www.shorensteincenter.org/transparency-social-media-wael-ghonim/. 
114 IAN GOODFELLOW ET AL., DEEP LEARNING (2016). 
115 Karl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
106 (2019). 
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to discover that knowledge of people’s personalities could be used to manipulate and influence 
them,116 and began to alter their algorithms, which are today notoriously elusive, to achieve those 
results.117 
Today, the engines of SNSs are advanced A.I. algorithms called “neural networks,” which 
replicate the structure of neurons in the human brain.118 Neural networks are arranged such that 
humans do not perceive their actual operation and do not get to fix the manner in which elements 
are weighed.119 These unperceivable networks are capable of “deep learning,” meaning they train 
themselves120 by using probability theory to navigate uncertain and ambiguous data121 and, 
thereby, increase their accuracy.122 Similar to earlier algorithms, with more experience they gain, 
the ‘smarter’ they become.123 Today, these advanced algorithms are so sophisticated they 
outperform human judgment.124 
A.I. has exponentially widened the spigot by which SNSs continue to amass massive 
 
116 Jacob Hirsh et al., Personalized Persuasion: Tailoring Persuasive Appeals to Recipients’ Personality Traits, 23 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 578 (2012). 
117 Nausicaa Renner, Memes Trump Articles on Breitbart’s Facebook Page, COLUM. J. REV. (Jan. 30, 2017), 
www.cjr.org/tow_center/memes-trump-articles-on-breitbarts-facebook-page.php. 
118 Jay Stanley, The Dawn of Robot Surveillance, AM. CIV. L. UNION (Jun. 17, 2019), www.aclu.org/report/dawn-
robot-surveillance (noting researchers believe that by mimicking the underlying structure of the brain they will be 
better able to mimic the intelligent tasks performed). 
119 Quoc V. Le et al., Building High-Level Features Using Large Scale Unsupervised Learning, ARXIV (Jul. 12, 2012). 
120 From Not Working to Neural Networking-Technology, ECONOMIST (Jun. 23, 2016). 
121 GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 114. 
122 Larry Hardesty, Explained: Neural Networks, MIT NEWS (Apr. 14, 2017), www.news.mit.edu/2017/explained-
neural-networks-deep-learning-0414. 
123 Natalie Wolchover, New Theory Cracks Open the Black Box of Deep Neural Networks, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2017), 
www.wired.com/story/new-theory-deep-learning/. 
124 Youyou et al., supra note 78 (finding computer-based models significantly more accurate than humans in a core 
social-cognitive task: personality judgment). 
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reserves of rich personal data,125 doing so at the cost of users’ personal privacy.126 Further, as the 
symbiotic relationship between the data-dependent SNSs A.I. algorithms and the implicitly 
compliant users deepens with increased engagement,127 new forms of digital deception, such as 
“deep fakes,” are developed and deployed.128  
II. THE PARADOX OF PRIVACY 
With data as the new oil129 and SNSs priming the pump courtesy of neuroscience,130 the 
resulting commodification of users131calls into question individual’s right to privacy. The largely 
unregulated SNSs have been permitted to violate and dictate new social norms as the audience of 
their oversight expands.132 For example, more than one-fourth of the world’s data is currently 
 
125 In 2016, YouTube announced the largest existence of a single dataset to date, consisting of content amassed from 
six million individual users content, organized and arranged into 4,800 categories. See, e.g., Sudheendra 
Vijayanarasimhan & Paul Natsev, Announcing YouTube-8M: A Large and Diverse Labeled Video Dataset for Video 
Understanding Research, GOOGLE AI BLOG (Sept. 28, 2016), http://ai.googleblog.com/2016/09/announcing-
youtube-8m-large-and-diverse.html; Sami Abu-El-Haija et al., YouTube-8M: A Large-Scale Video Classification 
Benchmark (Note: the initial announcement was subsequently reduced to 6 million). 
126 See generally, Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data: Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 
(2013); Jacob Kastrenakes, Google’s Chief Internet Evangelist Says, “Privacy May Actually Be an Anomaly,” THE 
VERGE (Nov. 10, 2013), www.theverge.com/2013/11/20/5125922/vint-cerf-google-internet-evangelist-says-
privacy-may-be-anomaly. 
127 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, Privacy 2.0, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND HOW TO STOP IT, 220 (2008) (“The more 
our identity is associated with our daily actions, the greater opportunities others will have to offer judgments about 
those actions.”). 
128 “Deep fakes" come from a specific type of "deep learning" in which pairs of algorithms are pitted against each 
other in “generative adversarial networks,” or GANS. See generally, Danielle Citron & Robert Chesney, Deepfakes 
and the New Disinformation War, FOREIGN AFF., Sept. 30, 2019. 
129 Data is the New Oil, ANA (Nov. 3, 2006), www.ana.blogs.com/maestros/2006/11/data_is_the_new.html (credited 
with the phrase “data is the new oil”); Fuel of the Future, 423 THE ECONOMIST, 14 (May 6, 2017) ("data has replaced 
oil as the world’s most valuable resource"); Charlie Warzel, Trump Is Tracking Your Phone, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 
2019), www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/opinion/trump-privacy-2020.html (“We live in a world that’s driven by data. 
It’s often called “the new oil.”); Vanian, supra note 57 (“Big Data is the new oil.”). 
130 See infra Part I. 
131 See, e.g. Richard Jenkings, How Much is Your Email Address Worth?, THE DRUM (Apr. 9, 2012), 
www.thedrum.com/opinion/2012/04/04/how-much-your-email-address-worth (reporting a market rate of $89 per e-
mail address); Lauren Feiner, Reddit Users Are the Least Valuable of Any Social Network, CNBC (Feb. 11, 2019), 
www.cnbc.com/2019/02/11/reddit-users-are-the-least-valuable-of-any-social-network.html (valuing Reddit users at 
$0.30); Jay R. Corrigan et al., How Much is Social Media Worth? Estimating the Value of Facebook by Paying Users 
to Stop Using It, 13 PLOS ONE (2018) (calculating a $1,000 per North American Facebook user). 
132 Julia Angwin et al., Facebook Enabled Advertisers to Reach ‘Jew Haters,’ ProPublica (Sept. 14, 2017), 
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governed by Facebook’s Terms of Service.133 SNSs’ access to and oversight of such an 
unprecedented breadth and depth of individuals134 has permitted the reshaping of traditional norms 
to better align with platform’s profits.135 This acquiescence ultimately stems from the United 
States’ detrimental decision during the Internet’s inception to prioritize accessibility of the internet 
over personal privacy concerns.136  
Part II provides a contextual overview of the legal right to personal privacy in the United 
States by looking at both its’ historical development and modern materialization. In understanding 
the foundation upon which the concept of privacy devoleped and the landscape in which its’ 
protections currently exist, the necessisty to revaluate and redefine personal privacy becomes clear.    
In order to maintain economic superiority on the world stage, the United States must modernize 
personal digital safeguards akin to the rest of the Western world.137 Section A traces the historical 
inceotion and development of the concept of personal privacy relative to technological 
developments. Section B takes a look at three of the most relevant regulatory institutions in regard 
 
www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enabled-advertisers-to-reach-jew-haters (reporting Facebook allowed 
placement of ads targeting and excluding African Americans, mothers, disabled people, Jews, and other minorities).  
133 Catherine Buni & Soraya Chemaly, The Secret Rules of the Internet, VERGE (Apr. 13, 2016), 
www.theverge.com/2016/4/13/11387934/internet-moderator-history-youtube-facebook-reddit-censorship-free-
speech. 
134 See, e.g. Milton Mueller, Hyper-Transparency and Social Control: Social Media as Magnets for Regulation, 39 
TELECOMM. POL'Y 804 (2015); Jack Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 
(2017) 1217, 1223 (“[T]he problem is not the robots; it is the humans.”). 
135 Clive Thompson, I’m So Totally, Digitally Close to You, N. Y. TIMES, at MM42 (Sept. 5, 2008) (quoting Mark 
Zuckerberg: "Facebook has always tried to push the envelope. And at times that means stretching people and getting 
them to be comfortable with things they aren’t yet comfortable with. A lot of this is just social norms catching up 
with what technology is capable of. In essence, Facebook users didn’t think they wanted constant, up-to-the-minute 
updates on what other people are doing. Yet when they experienced this sort of omnipresent knowledge, they found 
it intriguing and addictive. Why? Social scientists have a name for this sort of incessant online contact.”).  
136 See infra Part II.B.1. 
137 See, e.g., Mark Scott & Natasha Singer, How Europe Protects Your Online Data Differently Than the U.S., N. Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2016), www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/29/technology/data-privacy-policy-us-europe.html; 
Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Facebook, Google and Twitter Accept to Change Their Terms of Services to Make 
Them Customer-Friendly and Compliant with EU Rules (Feb. 5, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-
detail.cfm?item_id=614254. 
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to personal data privacy and assesses their relative current responses. 
A. The Concept  
Anonymity is foundational to the fabric of America,138 the protection of which has 
immense individual and societal value by way of self-determination and democratic 
deliberation.139 In an age when individual identity is automatically aligned with digital data, 
evaporating any autonomy one may have,140 personal privacy has no definitive legal protection141 
or privilege.142  
Personal privacy, like freedom, has always been difficult to define, yet definitive once 
 
138 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 368 & n.3 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“There is little 
doubt that the Framers engaged in anonymous political writing. The essays in the Federalist Papers, published under 
the pseudonym of 'Publius,' are only the most famous example of the outpouring of anonymous political writing that 
occurred during the ratification of the Constitution.”); id. at 361 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he historical evidence 
indicates that Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to require that anonymous authors reveal their identities on 
the ground that forced disclosure violated the 'freedom of the press.”'). 
139 Paul Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2087 (2004) ("[P]rivacy is 
necessary for both “individual self-determination” and “de- mocratic deliberation.' Based in part on civic 
republicanism, this conception views democracy as dependent on common participatory activities, reciprocal respect, 
and the need for consensus about political, , , "). 
140 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES, at MM30 (July 25, 2010) (“All around 
the world, political leaders, scholars and citizens are searching for responses to the challenge of preserving control of 
our identities in a digital world that never forgets. Are the most promising solutions going to be technological? 
Legislative? Judicial? Ethical? A result of shifting social norms and cultural expectations? Or some mix of the 
above?"); Mark Zuckerberg, From Facebook, Answering Privacy Concerns with New Settings, WASH. POST, at A19 
(May 24, 2010) (“We have heard the feedback. There needs to be a simpler way to control your information. In the 
coming weeks, we will add privacy controls that are much simpler to use. We will also give you an easy way to turn 
off all third-party services.”); Cecilia Kang, Senate Online Privacy Hearing to Draw FTC, FCC Chairs, Google, Apple 
and Facebook, WASH. POST: VOICES (July 23, 2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/07/ 
the_senate_commerce_committees.html (“Analysts said greater focus from Congress on online privacy has led Web 
sites and online ad networks to move toward self-regulation to fend off legislation. This self-regulation is aimed at 
greater disclosure on Web sites that consumers are being tracked, and an easy mechanism for opting out.”). 
141 Susan Brenner, The Privacy Privilege: Law Enforcement, Technology and the Constitution, 7 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 
(2003) 123, 191-92 (“The First Amendment protects the privacy of the identity and associates of an individual; the 
Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of the activities of an individual; and the Fifth Amendment protects the 
privacy of the thoughts of an individual.”) 
142 Id. at 137 ("By the time the Twenty-First Century dawned . . . [t]he rise and proliferation of cybercrime raised new 
problems[], both with the enforcement of existing substantive laws against conduct vectored through cyberspace and 
also in the gathering of evidence without violating the existing privacy standards.”). 
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removed.143 A legal right to privacy in the United States was initially tied to physical property and 
one’s physical person.144 In 1890, in response to technological uses and abuses of that time,145 
(specifically “Kodakers lying in wait”146) Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren conceived of a 
flexible,147 yet protective, idea of an individual legal right to privacy.148 Seventy years later, 
William Prosser defined and codified four tort causes of action149 surrounding such a right.150 The 
Supreme Court has noted that Prossor’s codification of the privacy torts was evidence of a “strong 
tide” in the states valuing personal privacy.151 
Today, Prosser’s four definitive causes of action, derived from an initially fluid concept 
and developed at a time when privacy was defined in tandem with physical property, have proven 
ineffective and insufficient to the intangible digital violations of SNSs.152 Scholarly critics claim 
that, although Prosser’s privacy parameters were necessarily enumerated, legal institutions have 
 
143 See Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy and Security of Personal Information: Economic incentives and Technological 
Solutions, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY, 179 (2004); see generally DANIEL SOLOVE, 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY ix (“There is no overarching conception of privacy-it must be mapped like terrain, by 
painstakingly studying the landscape . . . . Currently, privacy is a sweeping concept, encompassing (among other 
things) freedom of thought, control over one's body, solitude in one's home, control over personal information, 
freedom from surveillance, protection of one's reputation, and protection from searches and interrogations.”) 
144 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects...”). 
145 See, e.g., Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
146 Denis O’Brien, Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 440 (1902). 
147 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 145, at 293 (“Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new 
rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.”). 
148 Id. at 198–200. 
149 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (“The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of 
invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff . . . intrusion into seclusion, disclosure of private facts, false light 
publicity, and appropriation of likeness.”). 
150 See id. at 423 (1960) (“[I]t is high time that we realize what we are doing, and give some consideration to the 
question of where, if anywhere, we are to call a halt [in expanding the domain of privacy law].”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
151 See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487–88 (1975). 
152 See, e.g., Neil Richards & Daniel Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1889 
(2010); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 
CORNELL L. REV. 291, 362 (1983) (stating the privacy torts have “failed to become a useable and effective means of 
redress for plaintiffs”); Neil Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 357, 359–60 
(2011) (“For better or for worse, American law currently uses tools developed in the nineteenth and mid-twentieth 
centuries to deal with these problems of the twenty-first.”). 
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misunderstood their purpose, pigeonholed by precedent.153 Trying to retrofit traditional notions of 
privacy protections that emphasize public exposure is misplaced for modern digital dilemmas.154 
For example, under current legal standards, liability for data breaches lies solely with the 
individual who placed the data, penalizing them for their choice in place rather than the individual 
who breached it.155 As a scholar once summarized, “Horse law and haystack law are uneasily 
tolerated in the complex business of mass production and national distribution.”156  
‘Privacy’ originated as and has been redefined since as a reactionary concept.157 
Accordingly, throughout American history its’ parameters and protections have shifted in response 
to economic and societal developments. For instance, the caller identification on home telephones 
was once shunned as violations of privacy but are now used routinely to enhance personal 
 
153  See Lior Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2034 (2010): "[T]here have been many 
opportunities presented for judges to address [data privacy] problems via tort rules… [I]n the majority of cases, the 
courts have understood themselves to be junior partners to legislators and regulators in dealing with new privacy 
challenges. The possibility that legislators might want to legislate has convinced the courts to stop innovating through 
common law. And the unwillingness of judges to modernize tort protections to deal with new challenges has 
prompted legislators in turn to legislate in ad hoc, often incoherent ways.”). 
154 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 481 n.18 (2006) (highlighting the ways that the 
legal system may fall short when it comes to protecting privacy rights in general); Joel Reidenberg, Privacy in the 
Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L. J. 195, 208 (1992) (“The 
American legal system does not contain a comprehensive set of privacy rights or principles that collectively address 
the acquisition, storage, transmission, use and disclosure of personal information within the business community.”); 
Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1611 (1999) (“At present, however, 
no successful standards, legal or otherwise, exist for limiting the collection and utilization of personal data in 
cyberspace.”); Randall Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 80 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1133 (1992) (arguing society must adapt the legal concept of privacy and “embed[] [it] in a context different 
than external and social norms, one allowing its contours to fit the [contemporary] social and economic conditions,” 
and advancing a privacy model rooted in “the individual’s control of information” and “on an enforceable obligation 
of confidentiality for those possessing private information”). 
155 See generally Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law Approach for 
Data Breaches, 127 YALE L.J. F. 614 (2018). 
156 Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
465, 466 (1987). 
157 Sarah Igo, Private Lives? Leave Me Out, History Today (Jun. 28, 2018), www.historytoday.com/history-
matters/private-lives-leave-me-out (“As in the past, we do not stop to consider what privacy consists of until it seems 
– just like that – to fall victim to unimagined breaches. And, as in the 19th century, when wiretapping and candid 
photography were new, today’s technologies of data-harvesting and scraping are already transforming our beliefs 
about the borders of our private selves.”). 
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privacy.158 Although America has redefined privacy protections to meet the needs of individual 
issues of the times, the aims of individual determinism and democratic deliberation have always 
been at the core of its’ meaning.159  
The paramaters of a modern definition of personal privacy should, at a minimum, 
encompass an individual’s right to control their identity which is now inextricably tied to their 
digital data.160 Personal control over one’s identity is fundamental to individual liberty in 
America.161 It is only once an individual is empowered to take responsibility of their self can one 
engage in democratic deliberation through consent.162 Justice Story conceptualized of consent as  
“an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance the good or 
 
158 See generally, Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 65. 
159 See, e.g. Lee Bygrave & Kamiel Koelman, Privacy, Data Protection and Copyright: Their Interaction in the 
Context of Electronic Copyright Management Systems, in COPYRIGHT AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT 59, 64-65 (2000); see also Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech 
and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 1049 (2000). 
160 See ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, 7 (1968) (Writing that “Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others.”); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 805 (1989) (noting that "the right to privacy 
exists because democracy must impose limits on the extent of control and direction that the state exercises over the 
day-to-day conduct of individual lives”); See generally Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data: 
Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (2013) (arguing control of data must ultimately rest with the 
individual). 
161 Mark Andrus, The New Oil: The Right to Control One’s Identity in Light of the Commoditization of the Individual, 
AM. BAR ASS'N (September 28, 2017) www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/ 
09/06_andrus/. 
162 A number of privacy law scholars have documented how the imoprtance of consent  is currently impractically 
conditioned as an all-or-nothing proposition for users. See, e.g., Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies 
of Digital Consent, WASH. U. L. REV. (2019) ("Consent transforms the moral landscape . . . It reinforces fundamental 
cultural notions of autonomy and choice."); Elizabeth Edenberg & Meg Jones, Analyzing the Legal Roots and Moral 
Core of Digital Consent, 21 NEW MEDIA & SOC'Y 1804 (2019); Meg Leta Jones, The Development of Consent to 
Computing, IEEE ANNALS OF THE HISTORY OF COMPUTING 1 (2019); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006); NANCY KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS (2013); MARGARET RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE 
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 529 (2007); Scott Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85 (2014). 
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evil on each side.”163 Thus, consent naturally portends with control over one’s identity and is 
necessarily integral to a modern reconception of the reactionary concept of ‘privacy’. Tellingly, in 
a recent Congressional inquiry regarding abuse and misuse of personal data, the chief executive 
officer of Facebook, Mark Zuckerburg, looking to escape the potential of federal regulatory 
oversight, went out of his way to say more than one thousand times over the course of the hearing 
that he is working to ensure “Facebook puts users in ‘control’.”164  
B. The Institutions 
The amorphous nature of American personal privacy in the digital age has translated into 
a patchwork of ‘protections’165 that are often in conflict with other regulations and remedies166 and 
permits ample abuse. For example, in the first six months of 2019, there have been 3,800 publicly 
disclosed breaches of personal data, totaling an astonishing 4.1 billion individual records.167 
 
163 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence § 222 (1835). 
164 Facebook: Transparency and Use of Consumer Data: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 
115th Cong. 2 (2018) (statement of Mark Zuckerberg) www.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/ 
democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/Testimony-Zuckerberg-FC-Hrg-on-FacebookTransparency 
-and-Use-of-ConsumerData-2018-04-11.pdf; see also, Mark Zuckerberg, A Privacy-Focused Vision for Social 
Networking, FACEBOOK (Mar. 6, 2019), www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-privacy-focused-vision-for-
social-networking/10156700570096634/ (“This privacy-focused platform will be built around several principles: 
People should have simple, intimate places where they have clear control over who can communicate with them and 
confidence that no one else can access what they share.”); Dan Fletcher, Facebook Mania: Privacy Changes for 
Nearly 500 Million, TIME (May 20, 2010), www.content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1990798-4,00.html 
(“The way that people think about privacy is changing a bit. . .What people want isn’t complete privacy. It isn’t that 
they want secrecy. It’s that they want control over what they share and what they don’t."); Anita Balakrishnan et al., 
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s statements on privacy, 2003-2018, CNBC (Apr. 9, 2018), 
www.cnbc.com/2018/03/21/facebook-ceo-mark-zuckerbergs-statements-on-privacy-2003-2018.html ("When I built 
the first version of Facebook, almost nobody I knew wanted a public page on the internet. That seemed scary. But as 
long as they could make their page private, they felt safe sharing with their friends online. Control was key.”). 
165 Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy and Terms of Use., in SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE LAW 50 (2d ed. 2017). 
166 See, e.g., David Ruiz, US Congress Proposes Comprehensive Federal Data Privacy Legislation—Finally, 
Malwarebytes Labs (Mar. 7, 2019), www.blog.malwarebytes.com/security-world/privacy-security-
world/2019/03/what-congress-means-when-it-talks-about-data-privacy-legislation (“Businesses are expected to 
comply with data privacy laws based on the data’s type. Law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community, 
on the other hand, are expected to comply with a different framework that sometimes separates data based on 
“content” and “non-content.”) 
167 RISK BASED SECURITY, 2019 MIDYEAR QUICKVIEW DATA BREACH REPORT (Nov. 2019), 
https://pages.riskbasedsecurity.com/2019-midyear-data-breach-quickview-report. 
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Conversely, less than 1% of cybersecurity breaches were successfully enforced last year due the 
inability to identify the hacker source.168  
The current paradoxical dichotomy of providing privacy for digital abusers, but not 
innocent users,169 stems from the United States’ inception of the Internet when the government 
affirmatively chose not to implement digital security measures.170 Instead, government institutions 
have been left to their respective  devices171 to retrofit legal standards172 that are often inadequate 
deterrents for modern digital deceptions.173 In considering effectuating a meaningful privacy 
paradigm shift, each branch of government offers particular compententcies in effectuating 
such,174 and there is much scholarly debate as to the realitive efficacy of each.175 
 
168 Mieke Eoyang et al., To Catch a Hacker: Toward a Comprehensive Strategy to Identify, Pursue, and Punish 
Malicious Cyber Actors (Cyber Enforcement Initiative., Third Way), Oct. 29, 2018. 
169 See Laurie Baughman, Friend Request or Foe?, 19 WIDENER L.J. 933, 944 (2010) (“[SNS] run on the honor system. 
The sites do not check into whether a user who creates a profile is in fact a real person, so the creation of a fake 
profile is as easy as the creation of a real profile. A fake profile may allow an abuser to access the site of a victim or 
victim's family member, when an authentic profile would act as a red flag.”) (footnotes omitted). 
170 See Greg Allen & Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. AND INT'L AFF. 
(Jul. 2017). 
171 Debra Cassens Weiss, Does Fourth Amendment Protect Computer Data? Scalia Says It’s a Really Good Question, 
AM. BAR ASS'N (Mar. 24, 2014) www.abajournal.com/news/article/asked_about_nsa_stuff_scalia_says_conversa-
tions_arent_protected_by_fourth_a. 
172 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2209 (2018) (“The digital data at issue—personal location information 
maintained by a third party—does not fit neatly under existing precedents . . . .”) 
173 ANDREA WECKERLE, CIVILITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 251 (2013) ("Privacy laws, such as the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, are considered woefully antiquated. For example, email older than 180 days receives 
no privacy protection, and, under current law, it is possible to access these materials without a judge’s permission 
and simply with an administrative subpoena, which many privacy experts find disturbing.”) 
174 For an in-depth discussion on each branch’s strengths and weakness, see Matthew Scherer, Regulating Artificial 
Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 354 (2016). 
175 Connie Powell, “You Already Have Zero Privacy. Get Over It!,” 31 PACE L. REV. 146, 179–81 (2011) (arguing 
courts should extend the common law privacy causes of action to cover disclosure and commercialization of personal 
information); Jonathan Frieden et al., Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Leveraging Private Enforcement to 
Improve Internet Privacy, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1722–25 (2011) (stating courts should resolve privacy 
controversies and Congress should propose new legislation that establishes additional privacy causes of action); 
FREDERICK LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY: THE 400-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR MOST CONTESTED RIGHT 258 (2011) 
(disagreeing with a focus on court action and, instead, stressing the need for a new federal administrative agency 
with a broad mandate to define and prosecute privacy infringements); Catherine Schmierer, Better Late than Never: 
How the Online Advertising Industry’s Response to Proposed Privacy Legislation Eliminates the Need for 
Regulation, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 56–57 (advocating industry self-regulation is preferable anytime rapidly 
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1. The FTC 
The United States has always prioritized the collective public good stemming from the free 
flow of information over individual privacy.176 In the 1970s, the United States, along with the 
United Kingdom, created a framework of “fair information practice principles” (“FIPPs”)177 which 
encapsulated and promoted this priority of the collective good. Created as a model for Western 
nations to adopt and guide their respective data protection laws, FIPPs centered on four core 
principles: “(1) defined obligations that limited the use of personal data; (2) transparent processing 
systems; (3) limited procedural and substantive rights; and (4) external oversight.”178 Accordingly, 
in the early days of the Internet in the 1990s, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), encouraged 
American businesses to adopt and publish online privacy policies in line with these FIPPs.179 The 
United States even embodied the FIPPs in other statutory regulations outside the digital realm.180  
As the FIPPs were incorporated around the world alongside the spread of the Internet, the 
FTC abruptly diverted away from the core principles. In 1998, the FTC revised their focal priorities 
and declared the primacy of “notice,” or procedural rquirements, as the “most fundamental 
principle,” thereby abandoning the core commitments to substantive personal data protections.181 
The impact of the United States’ ideological departure from the FIPPs has reverberated into deep 
 
developing technology is involved); Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 
50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1342 (2009) (suggesting a system where people tag their data with labels indicating permissible 
uses). 
176 Westin, supra note 188; Margaret O’Mara, The End of Privacy Began in the 1960s, N. Y. TIMES, at A31 (Dec. 6, 
2018). 
177 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV., GUIDELINES ON PROTECT. OF PRIV'Y & TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERS. DATA 
(1981). 
178 Schwartz, supra note 139, at 1614. 
179 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (1998). 
180  See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2018) (consumer financial information); 45 C.F.R. 
§§160, 162, 164 (patient health data privacy). 
181 Privacy Online, supra note 179. 
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divides to this day.182 For example, the European Union has insisted on the development and use 
of “safe harbor” procedures,183 which have heightened levels of privacy protection, in all data 
commerce with the United States today.184  
The only American federal body authorized to oversee and administer personal data 
privacy regulations today is the FTC. 185 In line with the revised, FIPPs-free focus, and aside from 
a limited set of special circumstances,186 the agency’s jurisdiction is predicated on affirmative 
commercial misrepresentative practices,187 such as explicitly deceptive spam e-mails, misleading 
instructions, and fake advertisements.188 Under these FTC guidelines, SNSs’ neuroscientific 
driven data collection practices have, thusfar, been shielded,189 as long as somewhere on their 
 
182 See generally Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t 
Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 92 (2001); see also, e.g., O’Mara, supra note 197 (“This was a contrast to Western 
Europe, where privacy was something to be carefully protected, and therefore treated with a far more robust 
regulatory approach. In being so relentlessly focused on government’s use and abuse of data, Congress paid little 
attention to what private industry was doing. American companies remained free to gather data on people who use 
their products.”). 
183 EU-U.S. & Swiss-U.S. Privacy Shield. 
184 For more on this fracture and Europe’s relative success in continuing to follow the FIPPs, see, e.g., Paul Schwartz, 
European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on International Data Flows, 80 IOWA L. REV. 471 (1995); David 
Scheer, Europe’s New High-Tech Role: Playing Privacy Cop to World, WALL ST. J., at A1 (Oct. 10, 2003); Adam 
Satariano, New Privacy Law, Makes Europe World’s Leading Tech Watchdog, N. Y. TIMES, at A1 (May 25, 2018). 
185 FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 et seq. (2018) (empowering the agency broadly to enforce unfair or deceptive consumer 
data practices and to enforce federal privacy and data regulations). 
186 Specific limited jurisdictional authority was extended to the FTC in order to police privacy practices by the 
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2018); see also FED. TRADE 
COMM'N, CHILDREN’S PRIVACY (2018) www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/privacy-and-security/children 
%27s-privacy. 
187 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM, 5 Billion Facebook Settlement: Record-Breaking and History-Making (Jul. 24, 2019), 
www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2019/07/ftcs-5-billion-facebook-settlement-record-breakinghistory; 
Thompson Medical Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1986); In re International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 
949, 1041 (1984); PETER C. WARD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE § 5.04[2] 
(2002). 
188 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE (2018), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-
security-update-2018. 
189 In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., MDL No. 2843 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 9, 2019) (faulting 
Facebook for treating privacy as an “all-or-nothing” proposition, “sharing information with your social media friends 
does not categorically eliminate your privacy interest in that information.”)  
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platform some semblance of a privacy policy exists.190  
2. Congress 
Last year the Senate’s Commerce and Judiciary committees called Facebook Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) Mark Zuckerberg to testify to explain Facebook’s privacy policies in 
light of the mass Russian meddling on his network.191 Senator Orrin Hatch began by earnestly 
asking Mr. Zuckerberg, “[So], how do you sustain a business model in which users don’t pay for 
your service?”192 The CEO stifled a laugh, smirked, and replied, “Senator, we run ads.”193  
Like the courts, legislative bodies have been slow to respond to rapid digital 
advancements.194 While there have been numerous Congressional hearings on digital data privacy 
this year,195 neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate have enacted any comprehensive 
data protection legislation. Currently, Congress has set forth a sectorial statutory patchwork 
 
190 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (Mar. 2012); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously In 
Privacy Law, 19 STAN. L. REV 431 (2016); Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media 
Users Bound By Terms of Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405 (2010). 
191 Confessore et al., supra note 1. 
192 Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Commerce, 
Sci., & Trans.,  116th Cong. 1 (Apr. 10, 2018) (testimony of Mark Zuckerberg). 
193 Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018), www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing/. 
194 In 2016, the first Congressional hearing regarding A.I. was conducted, more than half a century after the military 
and sciences began developing such technology, see The Dawn of Artificial Intelligence, Hearing Before S. Comm. 
on Commerce, Science & Transp., 115th Cong. 2 (2016). 
195 See, e.g., Policy Principles for a Federal Data Privacy Framework in the United States, Hearing Before S. Comm. 
on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 116th Cong. 1 (2019); Protecting Consumer Privacy in the Era of Big Data, 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Cons. Protection & Commerce, 116th Cong. 1 (2019); Consumer Data Privacy: 
Examining Lessons from the European Union’s Data Protection Regulation and the California Consumer Privacy 
Act, Hearing Before S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 115th Cong. 2 (2018); Examining Safeguards for 
Consumer Data Privacy, Hearing Before S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 115th Cong. 2 (2018); 
Examining the Current Data Security and Breach Regulatory Notification Regime, Hearing Before Subcomm. on 
Fin. Inst. & Consumer Credit, 115th Cong. 1 (2018).  
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addressing data privacy statutes,196 some of which include a private right of action.197 Following 
September 11, 2001, personal privacy concerns198 have, again, taken a back seat to national 
security.199 While state legislatures have taken to slowly passing statutory regulations addressing 
personal data privacy,200 the effectiveness of their siloed protections is questionable in a boundary-
less digital world.  
New bipartisan calls for federal personal SNSs data protections following the 2016 election 
have increased,201 even prompting SNSs to preemptively ask for them in hopes of staving off more 
dense regulatory measures.202 Regardless, instead of taking a proactive prescriptive approach, the 
 
196 See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, H.R. 3103, 104th 
Cong. (codified in numerous different places, regulating protected health information in the health sector); Children's 
Online Privacy and Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6501, et seq. (regulating data of minors); Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (regulating data contained education records); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 6801, et seq.; Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (regulating the collection and use of 
consumer credit report data). 
197 See, e.g., Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
2710(C); Cable Privacy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 5I(f);  Electronic Communication Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2707. 
198 See Part.II.B.1. 
199 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
("USA PATRIOT ACT") Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. 
200 See, e.g., Vermont Data Broker Regulation, 9 V.S.A. §§ 2430, 2433, 2446, 2447 (2018) (regulating data 
brokers); California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (SB-1121) (creating the strongest personal privacy data rights in 
the world). Also, several Senators running for President this year have proposed similar national legislation, see e.g., 
Diane Bartz, “U.S. Senators Want Social Media Users to Be Able to Take Their Data with Them.” REUTERS (Oct. 
22, 2019), www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-antitrust-congress/u-s-senators-want-social-media-users-to-be-able-to-
take-their-data-with-them-idUSKBN1X112C; Marty Swant, Andrew Yang Proposes Digital Data Should Be Treated 
Like A Property Right, FORBES, www.forbes.com/sites/martyswant/2019/10/01/andrew-yang-proposes-digital-data-
should-be-treated-like-a-property-right/ (detailing regulatory proposals from presidential candidates Senators Amy 
Klobuchar and Elizabeth Warren, as well as Andrew Yang, that provide personal privacy protections over SNSs 
data). 
201 Pamela Maclean, Google Resists Becoming Digital ‘Town Square’ in Censorship Spat, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 
2018), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-15/google-resists-becoming-digital-town-square-in-censorship-
spat (“Silicon Valley’s social media giants are under attack from both the left and the right for not doing enough”). 
202 See, e.g., Ben Kochman, Tech Giants Want Uniform Privacy Law, But No GDPR, Law360 (Sept. 26, 2018), 
www.law360.com/articles/1086064 (“Representatives from Google LLC, Amazon.com Inc., Apple Inc., Twitter 
Inc., AT&T Inc. and Charter Communications Inc. all said they would support some sort of privacy law that would 
give consumers more control over the way in which their data is used.”); Harper Neidig, Advocates Draw Battle 
Lines over National Privacy Law, The Hill (Nov. 13, 2018), www.thehill.com/policy/technology/416341-advocates-
draw-battle-lines-over-national-privacy-law (reporting thirty-four public interest groups are now advocating for 
comprehensive federal data privacy legislation). 
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Trump Administration has double-downed on an institutional reactionary approach rather than 
develop preventive practices.203 In 2017, President Trump signed a congressional resolution to 
repeal protective measures enacted before his election that would have prevented internet service 
providers from collecting, mining, and selling customer information without permission.204 In line 
with President Trump’s change in course, his latest Attorney General, Robert Barr, demanded 
SNSs, such as Facebook, develop technology that gives the government access to more of users’ 
private online communications otherwise he would ensure punitive legislative measures would be 
“on the way.”205  
3. The Judiciary 
Absent explicit textual command, the courts have interpreted the United States Constitution 
as protecting personal rights to decisional and informational privacy.206 Attempts to establish 
whether such Constitutional protections extend to personal digital data have failed at their 
inception given the standing requirement,207 which requires a particularized, concrete, and 
imminent injury.208 The intangible nature of digital data deceptions has made it nearly impossible 
 
203 Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, NAT'L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. 
OF COMM., 83 Fed. Reg. 48600, 48601 (Sept. 26, 2018) (“The Administration is instead proposing that discussion of 
consumer privacy in the United States refocus on the outcomes of organizational practices, rather than on dictating 
what those practices should be.”) 
204 Steve Lohr, Trump Completes Repeal of Internet Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES, at B3 (Apr. 4, 2017). 
205 William Barr. Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of J., Keynote Address at Fordham University Int’l Conf. on Cyber 
Sec. (July 23, 2019). 
206  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV(containing the only explicit textual reference to information privacy); For 
decisional privacy reflected in jurisprudence, see e.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy); Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (identifying two 
different privacy interests which may be constitutionally protected: the interest of controlling the disclosure of 
personal matters and the interest in being able to make certain personal decisions free from government influence). 
207 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 409-10 (2013) (stating that imminence requires the alleged injury be 
“certainly impending” to constitute injury-in-fact, speculation and assumptions cannot be the basis.); Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (“In its constitutional dimension, standing imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff 
has made out a ‘case or controversy’ between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art. III. This is the 
threshold question in every federal case, determining power of the court to entertain.”) 
208 U.S. CONST. Art. III. 
                    Realistically Revaluating Social Media Data Protections   30 
 
for plaintiffs to successfully direct injury209 and subsequent, tangible harms.210 Conversely, in 
personal data adjudications governed by specific statutory protections that provides for a private 
cause of action, lower courts have  generally conferred standing.211 
The first Supreme Court case related to personal protections on the Internet was on First 
Amendment grounds,212 leaving lower courts213 and scholars214 to speculate the significance of 
prioritizing free speech over or even exclusive to a common law right to personal digital privacy.  
Two decades later, Justice Kennedy stated that, “While in the past there may have been difficulty 
in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the 
 
209 See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 272-76 (4th Cir. 2017) (relying on Clapper, dismissing a suit regarding 
two data breaches as too speculative); In re OPM Data Security Breach Litig., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1,35 (D.D.C. 2017) 
(acknowledging a data breach exposed sensitive information which could form the “building blocks” of identity theft, 
but dismissing as too attenuated); C.f. In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that 
“increased risk of future identity theft” could give rise to standing in data breach case following Clapper); Attias v. 
Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding plaintiffs plausibly alleged “substantial risk” of 
identity theft in data breach case where “[n]o long sequence of uncertain contingencies involving multiple 
independent actors has to occur before the plaintiffs in this case will suffer any harm”). 
210 See Robins v. Spokeo, 867 F.3d 1108, 1118  (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied Spokeo v. Robins, 138 S. Ct. 931, 1549 
(2018) (remanding because plaintiff needed to  demonstrate a concrete injury separate from a particularized injury, 
meaning show that their injury “actually exist[ed].”) Note: On remand, the lower court determined plaintiff’s alleged 
injury was both concrete and particularized, and thus, had standing. 
211 See, e.g., Eichenberger v. ESPN, 876 F.3d 979, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2017) (asserting standing for violations of the 
right to privacy under the Video Privacy Protection Act); Susinno v. Work Out World, Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 352 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (holding customer’s receipt of unsolicited calls in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
was sufficiently concrete); In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 640–41 (3d Cir. 
2017) (“So the Plaintiffs here... allege [] the unauthorized dissemination of their own private information—the very 
injury that FCRA is intended to prevent. There is a de facto injury that satisfies the concreteness requirement for 
standing.”). 
212 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (explaining the importance of “provid[ing] the Internet with the broadest 
possible First Amendment protection"). 
213 See, e.g., Birnbaum v. U.S., 588 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1978) (describing the distinction between common law and 
constitutional privacy claims); Drake v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974, 980 (M.D. Ala. 1974) 
(Johnson, C.J., concurring) (stating that the Warren-Brandeis right of privacy is a creature of state law and is not 
constitutionally based); Mimms v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. 352 F. Supp. 862, 865 n. 5 (E. D. Pa. 1972) 
(distinguishing right of privacy from constitutional cases); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (constitutional 
right to privacy limited to unreasonable government searches or interference with matters relating to family and 
reproduction). 
214 See e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to 
Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000) (opining “the privacy torts may be of limited 
practical and doctrinal utility in a society that also prioritizes freedom of speech”); Jack Balkin, Free Speech is a 
Triangle, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 2011 (2012) (writing “at least until the courts begin to treat cyberspaces differently 
from other public fora—applying First Amendment law would cripple [SNSs'] abilities to impose civility norms”). 
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answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ in general, and social 
media in particular.”215 Again, the lower courts and scholars quickly interpreted this statement as 
the Court’s signaling the preeminence of free speech on the Internet over all else.216  
These, quick interpretations of the Supreme Court are fundamentally flawed and indicative 
of the need for a uniform national law protecting personal digital privacy. The lower courts and 
scholars’ logic mistakes content, which is digital speech, with individuals actions on SNSs, such 
as posting, liking, and commenting, which is collected as digital data. In other words, content is 
what users say, data is what they do. are indicative of the necessity for a uniform national law 
protecting personal data privacy.    
III. THE PROPERTIZATION OF PERSONAL SOCIAL MEDIA DATA  
A complex issue requires an innovative, nuanced solution and sincethe New Deal, some 
regulatory measures have been driven by shifting societal considerations, not constitutionally 
constrainted.217 Given the integral role neuroscience plays in the symbiotic digital ecosystem 
between the individual and SNSs, a modern solution must necessarily account for the science, as 
well. Accordingly, casting personal digital data as personal property in American common law 
most accurately reflects how both individuals already implicitly view their online and offline 
actions as one in the same and SNSs’ commodification of individuals allows them to profit. Section 
 
215 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
216 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011) (“[T]he creation and dissemination of information 
are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.”); see also Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 57, 71–72 (2014) (arguing that data should be treated as speech for purposes of the First Amendment); cf. Los 
Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (characterizing personal information as a 
“thing in commerce”); Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (holding sale of personal information is not being 
treated as speech). 
217 See generally Neil Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501 
(2015) (arguing the pervasiveness of data in society today means we must necessarily conceive its protections under 
commercial regulation principles not constitutional concepts like freedom of speech). 
                    Realistically Revaluating Social Media Data Protections   32 
 
A defines and details the idea of SNSs data as personal property. Section B explains the resulting 
role SNSs would play in such a shift as information bailees. 
A.  The Idea 
 
The economic outlook218 and scientific studies219 already consider personal digital data as 
property. American legal institutions, on the other hand, have yet to align effectively with this 
reality, as previously discussed. The importance of defining and demarcating digital data as 
personal property allows for individuals, institutions, and SNSs, alike, to develop policies and 
protocols reflective of fundamentally equitable values.220   
The traditional definition of a ‘property’ right is an “interest. . . that is enforceable against 
the world.”221 Reconceptualizing digital data as a personal right against the world, aligns with the 
previously discussed modern reevaluation of privacy consisting of control and consent,222 best 
 
218 Palmer, supra note 129. 
219  Karolina Sylwester & Matthew Purver, Twitter Language Use Reflects Psychological Differences between 
Democrats and Republicans, 10 PLOS ONE (2015) (discovering that the psychological disparities among people 
with differing political orientations through individual word use on Twitter was resonant with previous research; 
liberals tend to place more emphasis on uniqueness and use more swear words, anxiety- and feeling-related words 
while conservatives value group association and their tweets contain more achievement and religion-related words); 
Danah Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in Teenage Social Life, 
MACARTHUR FOUNDATION SERIES ON DIGITAL LEARNING –YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA VOLUME 15 119, 
129 (2008) (“Because of the intricate connection between offline and online social worlds, the audience that teens 
envision online is connected to their social world offline, or to their hopes about the possible alternatives online.”); 
Dar Meshi et al., The Emerging Neuroscience of Social Media, 19 TRENDS IN COGN. SCI. 771 (2015) (“While the 
neural systems supporting these social cognitive processes have been studied extensively in the offline world, the 
online social media is comparatively new. However, experts continue to conclude that the digital world often mimics 
the offline social world and interactions within this online social network parallel offline social interactions.”). See 
generally CHRISTINE HINE, VIRTUAL ETHNOGRAPHY (2000); Malene Charlottte Larsen, Perspectives on Online 
Social Networking, 35 SOC. COMP. MAG. (2007).. 
220 Samuelson, supra note 184, at 1170–71 (“[A] serious impediment to a comprehensive approach [to privacy] in the 
U.S. is the lack of clarity… about the nature of the interest that individuals have in information about themselves: Is 
it a commodity interest, a consumer protection interest, a personal dignity interest, a civil right interest, all of the 
above, or no interest at all?”). 
221 Paul Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2059-51 (2004) (explaining this 
right against the world does not mean “Blackstonian despotism over the res, but rather a bundle of related interests 
relating to the res.”) 
222 See infra Part II.A. 
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redefined relative to data-as-property as the individual’s ability and right to decide on and 
demarcate boundaries (if any) around their property.223 A propertization of individuals personal 
data would include the common law rights that run with property,224 including transferability and 
alienability.225 Propertization of personal data also reaffirms the Framer’s fundamental aims of 
democratic deliberation and indivual determinism by reallocating property to its’ rightful owner 
as it empowers and encourages such exchanges. 226   
America has a long history of defining and regulating privacy in tandem with property.227, 
In fact, some courts have already indicated an inclination to apply property principles to digital 
intangibles.228 While some scholars are sharply divided on the efficacy of treating digital data as 
property believing it could lead to a slippery slope of black-market data tradingm229 other  would 
 
223 Julie Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000) 
(defining “privacy as shorthand for breathing room to engage in the processes of boundary management that enable 
and constitute self-development.”). 
224 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification:  The Numerus Clausus Problem and 
the Divisibility of Rights, J. LEG. STUD. S373 (2002) (conceptualizing information as a property right that "runs with 
the asset"). 
225 Thomas Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2079 (2012) ("Property law’s hallmark is the 
right of alienation—the voluntary right to agree to transfer one’s property, real or personal—to another."). 
226 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, HARV. L. REV. 1092 (1972) (arguing that in a property regime “the value of the entitlement is agreed upon 
by the seller.”) 
227 See infra, Part II.B. 
228 Salonclick LLC v. Superego Mgmt. LLC,. 2555 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017) (acknowledging SNSs have a possessory 
interest in their domain names); Sprinkler Warehouse, Inc. v. Systematic Rain, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 16, 23 (Minn. 2016) 
(holding an Internet domain is intangible personal property); Integrated Direct Mktg., LLC v. May, 495 S.W.3d 73, 
76 (Ark. 2016) (holding intangible property, such as electronic data, can be converted); In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 
359 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015) (holding SNSs accounts are property interests under the bankruptcy code, and therefore 
reversion applies). 
229 See, e.g., Julie Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 
1391 (2000) (“Recognizing property rights in personally-identified data risks enabling more, not less, trade and 
producing less, not more, privacy.”); Anita Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 750–57 (1999); 
Simon Davies, Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has Been Transformed from a Right to a 
Commodity, in TECH. AND PRIV. 143, 160 (Philip Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997); Mark Lemley, Private 
Property: A Comment on Professor Samuelson’s Contribution, 52 STAN. L. REV 1545, 1551 (2000) ("from a privacy 
perspective, an intellectual property right that is regularly signed away may turn out to be less protection than we 
want to give individuals."); Rotenberg, supra note 204, at 92–97; Samuelson, supra note 184, at 1443. 
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like to take the idea to the other extreme, disregarding privacy concerns, altogether.230  
B.  The Information Bailees 
Recasting the role of SNSs as information bailess best reflects the reality of the current 
digital ecosystem. SNSs’ rely on and are driven by individuals engaging and thereby creating the 
personal data which the platforms, in turn, commodify. In creating and harvesting this digital 
dependence, SNSs should have, and arguably already do, the role and responsibilities of bailees.231  
Revising the roles of SNSs as fiduciaries recalibrates the power dynamics of their 
relationship with users. Today, SNSs implicitly encourage users to trust them with personal 
information, so implementing a corresponding duty of confidentiality and care on SNSs is not such 
a stretch. The current implicit contractual relationship between SNSs and users232 is is 
asymmetrically disadvantageous to individuals. Simnilar to personal physicians and lawyers, SNSs 
relationship with users presupposes contractual duties.233  
 
 
230 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 61, at 143–63; Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight, 11 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 26, 26–41 (1996); Richard Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic 
Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2385 (1995–1996); Developments in the Law — The Law of Cyberspace, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1634–49 (1999); Kenneth Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 39 COMM. OF ACM 92, 92 (1996). 
231 Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1183, 1209 (2016)(“An 
information fiduciary is a person or business who, because of their relationship with another, has taken on special 
duties with respect to the information they obtain in the course of the relationship.”); Jack Balkin, The Three Laws 
of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. (2017)(“When fiduciaries collect and process information about 
their clients, . . . [t]hey are information fiduciaries.”). 
232 See, e.g., Terms of Service, Facebook (Jul. 31, 2019), www.facebook.com/terms (“We cannot predict when issues 
might arise with our Products. Accordingly, our liability shall be limited to the fullest extent permitted by applicable 
law, and under no circumstance will we be liable to you for any lost profits, revenues, information, or data, or 
consequential, special, indirect, exemplary, punitive, or incidental damages arising out of or related to these 
Terms...”); Terms of Service, Twitter www.twitter.com/content/twitter-com/legal/en/tos.html (May 25, 2018) (“in no 
event shall the aggregate liability of the twitter entities exceed the greater of one hundred U.S. dollars”); Terms of 
Use, Instagram www.help.instagram.com/581066165581870 (“You agree that we won't be responsible for any lost 
profits, revenues, information, or data, or consequential, special, indirect, exemplary, punitive, or incidental damages 
arising out of or related to these Terms, even if we know they are possible.”). 
233 Balkin, supra note 230. 
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CONCLUSION 
Recasting personal data as property and revising the role of SNSs as bailess avoids the 
prickly path of complex constitutional considerations234 and accurately accounts for encapsulates 
the science already existing in their symbiotic relationship.  To further entice SNSs to shift their 
role and reshape their relationship with users, some scholars have proposed regulations affording 
the platforms greater constitutional protections, particularly preempting the patchwork of state 
privacy laws.235  
 
 
 
234 See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 210–11 (1985) (distinguishing between regulation of public and private 
investment advisors in order to prevent “fraud, deception, or overreaching”); ROBERT POST, DEMOCRACY, 
EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 22–23 (2012) 
(arguing a central distinction in First Amendment between public discourse, which the state can regulate in limited 
ways, and professional speech, which the state can regulate broadly to protect the interests of clients and 
beneficiaries). 
235 See Jack Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, The Atlantic (Oct. 
3, 2016), www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/ (proposing that if digital 
businesses “agree to a set of fair information practices, including security and privacy guarantees… the federal 
government would preempt a wide range of state and local laws” affecting them). 
